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NOTE AND COMMENT
LIMITATIONS UPON THE USE, AETER SALE, OV PATENTED AITIcLs.-In the
case of Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Co., 37 Sup. Ct. 416,
the Supreme Court has just rendered a decision which reverses the much
discussed case of Henry v. Dick Co., 224 U. S. I. The opinion was by a
divided court, however, as three of the justices dissented, and Justice Mc-
REYNOLDS "concurred in the result" only. It can, therefore, hardly be said
to -settle the ultimate rule as in contradiction to that foll6wed in Henry v.
Dick Co., and discussion of the case is of something more than mere academic
value.
The facts were that the plaintiff was owner of a patent covering a neces-
sary part of the mechanism on moving picture projecting machines. This
particular device was of such efficiency as to be in general use, to the prac-
tical exclusion of all substitutes. The plaintiff granted a license to manu-
facture and sell these parts, the licensee agreeing that it would not sell them ex-
cept under agreement with each vendee, for himself and his assigns, that they
should be used only with a certain type of film. This licensee sold a machine
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to an exhibition company which, in turn, transferred it to the defendant, the
Prague Amusement Company. Thefe was no privity-of contract between this
defendant and the plaintiff, but the defendant took the machine with notice
of the restriction. The defendant,, the Universal Film Manufacturing Com-
pany, supplied films to the Prague Company for use-on the machine, having
itself beeft notified of the restriction. The question raised was whether the
Testriction upon the use of the machine was enforcible against one not a
party to the agreement, but who had notice of it.
The restriction is, in appearance, one upon the full and free enjoyment
of a corporeal chattel, placed there by an erstwhile owner who has parted
with the title. The obvious inquiry is whether limitations upon the perfect
ownership of personal property are enforcible in the. courts.
It may be said at the outset that in this particular respect the Patent
Statute does not affect the inquiry. It provides nothing in respect to the
ownership of property nor its transfer, except in the indirect way to be re-
ferred to later. All it does is to create a new form of incorporeal property,
namely, the legal right in a patentee to exclude others from enjoyment of
his invention. The invention itself is not corporeal, it is a concept of means
to an end. It is the "ownership" of this concept which the Patent Statute
creates.
Whether restrictions upon the enjoyment of personal property are en-
forcible at common law is undecided. Negative restrictions upon the com-
plete enjoyment of real property may be so created as to be enforcible at
law, or, as in England, in equity, against subsequent owners acquiring the
property with notice. TIFFANY, REAL PROP., §349. The reason given by
one court, (Parker v. Nightingale, 6 Allen 341, 83 Am. Dec. 632), is simply
that "restrictions and limitations which mady be put on property by means
of such stipulations, derive their validity from the right which every owner
of the fee has to dispose of his estate, either absolptely or by a qualified
grant, or to regulate the manner in which it shall be used and occupied."
Restrictions as to the type of use of real estate are common. Blakemore v.
Stanley, 159 Mass. 6; Keening v. Ayling, 126 Mass. 494.
The fundamental reason for allowing them is of course merely one of
public policy, and its expression, as formulated by the court quoted from,
applies to personal property as pertinently as it does to real estate. But
that it does not in fact extend to personal property is indicated in occasional
dicta. A writer in 28 LAW QUARTERLY RviEW., 73, says, "In the case of
chattels generally, any restriction as to their use can only be imposed by
means of a contractual relation between a vendor and his purchaser, and
will extend no further than the contractual relation extends." He cites no
authority, however, and the present writer can find none except in resftect
to restrictions upon the re-sale price. Although these particular restrictions
arm held unenforcible, that does not necessarily indicate a difference between
other- restrictions on personalty and those on realty, because restrictions upon
the alienation of real property are also held in disfavor by the courts. GRAY,
RE STRAINTS ON; ALImNATION. In some of the cases holding price restric-
tions unenforcible there are intimations that all restrictions come under the
HeinOnline  -- 15 Mich. L. Rev.  582 1916-1917
NOTE AND COMMENT
same -rule. Thus the court in John D. Park & Sons v. Hartman, 153 Fed.
24, 39, in passing upon the validity of a system of contracts restricting re-sale
price, says, "It is also a general rule of the common law that a contract
restricting the use or controlling sub-sales can not be annexed to a chattel
so as to follow the article and obligate the sub-purchaser by operation of
notice. A covenant which may be valid and run with land will not run
with or attach itself to a mere chattel." See also, Taddy v. Sterious, [x9o4],
i Ch. Div., 354; Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373.
A few other cases indicate, by analogy, a difference in respect to restrictions
upon realty and personalty in holding that although express warranties run
with the ownership of the former they do not follow that of the latter. Smith
v. Williams, 117 Ga. 782; Prater v. Campbell, Iio Ky. 23.
This uncertain state of the common law certainly permits a decision that
restrictions upon its use can not be made to follow the ownership of a
chaftel. The decision in the Motion Picture Patents case is therefore per-
fectly sound, if one considers the restriction in that case as one sought to be
imposed by the plaintiff upon the use of the projecting machine.
But was this restriction, after all, created by the plaintiff or any other
owner of the chattel? Did the plaintiff not, rather, release, to a limited
extent, a restriction upon the defendant's use .of the chattel, which was
actually imposed by the Patent Statute? Ownership of a chattel, however
untrammelled by agreement it may be, does not ipso facto connote and carry
with it an unrestricted right to use the chattel. By virtue of the Patent
Statute, the owner is precluded from using it at all, if its use happens to
constitute enjoyment of a patented invention. Even though the owner may
have created the chattel himself, he is absolutely restrained from its use under
such circumstances. The patentee of an invention may refuse permission to
any 6r all owners of chattels, which embody his invention, to use them, how-
ever their ownership may have been come by. Continental Paper Bag Co.
v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U. S. 405.
The writer can think of no reason why, if a patentee in his own discretion
can forbid or permit an owner to use his property, he may not grant a
modified permission, and limit the extent of the authorized use. It is at least
the logical postulate that if the right to use, regardless of ownership, depends
upon permission, wholly at the patentee's discretion, he may grant the right
of use to such greater or less exent as his discretion dictates. When a
patentee*himself sells a tangible thing embodying his invention, the presump-
tion is that he gives with it all the usual rights of ownership unrestricted by his
own patent monopoly. But when in selling the thing he delimits the right
of user by express stipulation, there is no room for any such presumption.
This has been the holding of practically all the cases prior to the principal
one, although it must be confessed that reasons given have not always been
either definite or consistent. The courts have upheld limitations which al-
lowed invasion of the monopoly in a specified respect only (Pope Mfg. Co. v.
Gormully, 144 U. S. 248), or for specified purposes only (Gamewell Fire-
alarm Telegraph Co. v. Brooklyn, I4 Fed. 255), or which gave the right to
use a particular machine on condition that no other machines of the same
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kind be used (United States v. Winslbw, 227 U. S. 202), or to use the device
only at the licensee's place of business' (Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 9 Wall. 788),
.or to use on condition that the product of the device should not be sold
below a certain price (Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U. S. 7o), or to
use for a limited time only (Mitcfhell v. Hawley, 16 Wall. 544). Permission
to use only with certain films, seems to be an absolute analogy. It -has been
held, also, that one who voluntarily or otherwise pays full damages for
having unauthorizedly made, used or sold a chattel embodying a patented in-
vention does not thereby acquire any right to continued use or enjoyment
of the chattel, nor is his vendee thereof in any better position. Birdsell v.
Shaliol, im1 U. S. 485. And this is despite the fact that the one so precluded
from enjoyment is in all other respects the "owner" of the particular thing.
These restrictions have been enforced as though they were unreleased
restrictions of the patent law, and not as limitations originally imposed by
one individual upon another. This is the ground on which the decision was
expressly based, in the English case of Incandescent Gas Light Co. v. Cantelo,
12 Rep. Pat. Cas. 262. "The patentee," said that court, "has the sole right of
using and selling the articles, and he may prevent anybody from dealing with
them at all. Inasmuch as he has the right to prevent people from using them
or dealing in them at all, he has the right to do the lesser thing, that is to
say, to impose his own conditions." In accord are, British Muttoscope & Bio-
graph Co. v. Homer, [igoi], i Ch. Div. 671; National Phonograph Co. v.
Menck, [igii], A. C. 336. All of this authority is completely in accord with
the holding of Henry v. Dick Co., which cites still other precedents.
When one recognizes the restriction of use in the Motion Picture Patents
case for what it really is, namely, a limited release of a statutory restriction,
and is not misled by its mere form of expression, the decision in the case is
-learly in conflict with both logic and precedent. The court admits itself to
ave been influenced by a feeling that the restriction, if sustained, "would be
ravely injurious to that public interest, which we have seen is more a
avorite of the law than is the promotion of private fortunes." The fault
owever, if any, is with the Patent Statute which imposed the restriction,
rather than with.the patentee who relieved the public, at least to some extent,
from its rigorous and absolute prohibitions. J. B. W.
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